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Abstract 
This paper examines the ways in which policies are transferred between places: how they are 
disembedded from, and re-embedded into, new political, economic and social contexts. To 
do this, the paper will draw upon a case study of the transfer of Business Improvement 
Districts (BIDs) from the US to England and Wales. Within this, the paper demonstrates 
how they were a response to fiscal problems facing city centre management in England and 
Wales; how US BIDs were socially constructed as ‘successful’ and ‘transferable’; and how the 
BID ‘model’ was reshaped prior to and following its rolling-out in England and Wales. The 
paper concludes by stressing six wider conceptual points about the nature of urban policy 
transfer. 
 
1. Travelling Tales of Success: Business Improvement Districts in the US and 
Beyond 
For Paul Levy (2001, p. 130), the President of the Center City District in Philadelphia, “one 
thing is certain ... America’s downtowns are back”. Looking out from his office in 
downtown Philadelphia, this is plain to see: “rising occupancy rates, new housing, thriving 
parks and new outdoor cafes, they’re alive day and night with a positively European flair ... 
For the first time in a long time, there is optimism in the air” (Levy, 2001, p. 130). The 
changing fortunes of downtown Philadelphia and other American cities, he argues, are no 
coincidence. Instead, they are the result of the rapid proliferation of Business Improvement 
Districts (BIDs) across the US during the 1990s onwards. 
By 2004, over 429 BIDs had emerged in a variety of downtown, inner-city, suburban 
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and rural business districts in the US (Hoyt, 2004). From Levy’s Center City District to the 
downtown BID in Madison, Wisconsin, BIDs across the US share a common essence. That 
is, they are publicly sanctioned yet privately directed organisations that supplement public 
and private services to improve geographically defined, outdoor public spaces and business 
services (Hoyt, 2004). Most importantly, they are all funded primarily through a multi-year, 
compulsory business taxation mechanism. This taxation is not aimed at all businesses, 
however, but for the overwhelming majority of US BIDs, it is property owners within the 
district that are charged a small annual fee. The services they provide vary from BID to BID. 
Nonetheless, public space cleaning and maintenance, securing of public spaces and 
businesses, and marketing of the BID area are the most common services domains (see 
Briffault, 1999; Hoyt, 2004; Morçöl and Zimmerman, 2006). 
As Levy and others will tell you, BIDs and their services have been remarkably 
successful. If you walk across the street from a BID area to a non-BID area, you are likely to 
notice a disparity in the cleanliness of the sidewalks and the numbers of trash cans being 
emptied. The BID in Times Square, for instance, collected 1235 tons of refuse, removed 
4505 stickers and cleaned 740 incidents of graffiti during 2005 (Times Square Alliance, 2005). 
Not only has the BID made the area cleaner, some onlookers argue that it has also made the 
area safer and less threatening, thanks largely to the BID’s patrolling Public Safety Officers 
(McDonald, 2001). 
By rectifying the small signs of disorder in public space, MacDonald (2000) reasons 
that BIDs have encouraged once-hesitant consumers and investors back to these districts. 
When viewed in this way, it is easy to link the economic and social revival of, for instance, 
the area around 42nd Street in New York City in the past 15 years with the introduction and 
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operations of three BIDs in the area. Indeed, the Times Square Alliance, Grand Central 
Partnership and Bryant Park Corporation have been widely praised for their role in lowering 
crime rates and vacancy rates, and increasing visitor numbers, rental values and property 
values in their districts (New York City Department of Small Business Services, 2004; 
Sagalyn, 2001; Thompson, 1997). What is more, after years of public-sector funding cuts and 
retrenched and overworked public services, BIDs appear to offer a private-sector-led 
solution to reviving business districts and declining public services. 
What MacDonald, Levy and others might not tell you, however, is that BIDs have 
some worrying facets and associations and do not have unanimous support. To be sure, BID 
officials and advocates are still unable to demonstrate clearly the causality, rather than 
correlation, between their BID’s introduction and operations and the social and economic 
transformations taking place in their area. This is, for instance, demonstrated by the 
hesitancy of academics firmly to attribute crime reduction in Philadelphia BID areas (Hoyt, 
2005) and increases in property prices in New York City BID areas (Ellen et al., 2006) to 
their respective BIDs. What is more, businesses frequently perceive the BID levy as 
unnecessary additional business taxation. In contrast, some left-leaning academics have 
argued that, amongst other things, BIDs are unaccountable and undemocratic (Hochleutner, 
2003); represent the privatisation of public space regulation (Mitchell and Staeheli, 2006); 
and impinge on citizens’ political freedoms and the civil liberties of targeted, disadvantaged 
groups such as the homeless and unlicensed street traders (Clough and Vanderbeck, 2006; 
Katz, 1998). 
In spite of these problems and fuzzy linkages, BIDs and their associated success 
stories have become very attractive to many US businesses and policy-makers in search of a 
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policy prescription for their business districts. What is more, these success stories have 
captured the attention of policy-makers and businesses in Europe (Houstoun, 2005). Indeed, 
since 2002, Germany, Ireland, Serbia, Albania, England and Wales have all introduced BIDs. 
Whilst BIDs were evident in Canada, New Zealand, Jamaica and South Africa prior to their 
introduction in Europe (Hoyt, 2004, 2006), it is the US that has provided the inspiration for 
their European introduction. In England and Wales, where BIDs legislation was passed in 
2003, national and local policy-makers and advocates continue to speak of the US origins of 
BIDs and their successes in the US (Ward, 2006). Stories of the BID operations and 
downtown transformations in New York City, Philadelphia and Washington, DC, in 
particular, continue to be cited in a variety of political, business and media arenas. 
Rather than detail the successes of BIDs in England and Wales—where the juries are 
still out—this paper will explore how and why US BIDs and their associated stories of 
success have had a profound influence on BIDs policy and practice in England and Wales. 
The paper, henceforth, is spilt into three parts. The first outlines the role of policy transfer 
within urban governance and develops a process-based framework for understanding urban 
policy transfer. The second draws upon this framework to explore the processes through 
which the BID ‘model’ has been disembedded, mobilised and re-embedded into new 
political, economic and social contexts. In doing this, it critically examines the framing of 
BIDs as ‘successful’ and as an ‘appropriate’ policy prescription to the fiscal problems facing 
city centre management. The paper concludes by pinpointing six conceptual issues that can 
inform future studies of urban policy transfer. 
This paper draws on an on-going research project investigating the importation and 
(re)embedding of BIDs in England and Wales and locally into the urban arenas of Coventry, 
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Plymouth and Reading (September 2004– onwards). Methodologically, the research primarily 
involved semi-structured interviews with over 60 public and private élites in the US and UK. 
The interviewees were selected due to their role in transferring BID policy and practice from 
the US and/or developing and rolling-out BID policy and practice nationally as well as 
locally in Coventry, Plymouth and Reading. Elite interviewing was supported by a critical 
discourse analysis of selected core policy documents, websites, policy speeches and media 
documents. This critical discourse analysis focused upon identifying the linguistic strategies 
and techniques used by the writers and speakers to convince their audience of their policies’ 
legitimacy, necessity and future (or existing) successes. Used together, these methods helped 
to reveal the experiences, rationales and legitimisation strategies behind the mobilisation of 
BIDs in(to) England and Wales. 
 
2. Conceptualising Urban Policy Transfer 
US BIDs are not the first ‘actually existing’ urban policies to have attracted attention from, 
and been emulated by, curious policy-makers, practitioners and advocates elsewhere. Indeed, 
a handful of urban policies have been become internationally renowned ‘policy meccas’ that 
policy-makers and practitioners continue to read about, hear about, discuss, perhaps visit, 
and consider whether to emulate. Over the past 30 years, perhaps the best-known of these 
are Baltimore (for its Harborplace re-development), Bilbao (for the Guggenheim Museum 
redevelopment), New York City (for its ‘zero tolerance’ policing strategies) and Barcelona 
(for its public spaces, urban design and management of the 1992 Olympic Games) (see 
Dixon and Maher, 2005; Jones and Newburn, 2007; Monclús, 2003; S. Ward, 2006). From 
featuring in good-practice regeneration guides to being the subject of study tours and 
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international conference presentations, these places, policies and their apparent successes 
have been translated into a wide variety of ‘off-the-peg’ policy remedies (Peck and Theodore, 
2001, p. 433). 
As studies of policy transfer have demonstrated, UK policy-makers have frequently 
turned to the US for inspiration, notably in the fields of urban policy and welfare reform, in 
the past 30 years. Alongside BIDs, the most notable policies with US origins are the Urban 
Development Grant (Wolman, 1992), the Child Support Agency (Dolowitz, 2001), Working 
Families’ Tax Credits and the New Deal ‘welfare-to-work’ programme (Peck and Theodore, 
2001). For Dolowitz et al. (1999), these trans-Atlantic policy transfers are facilitated by the 
common language, shared ideology and strong personal political relations. Peck and 
Theodore (2001) further reason that New Labour has engaged in ‘fast policy transfer’ as it is 
perceived to deliver ‘quick fixes’ to domestic economic and social problems. By emulating 
seemingly successful policy solutions that address seemingly similar problems, policy 
prescriptions are available without time-consuming, costly policy formation and the rolling-
out of ‘untested’ policies. More widely, McCann (2004, 2007) and Wolman and Page (2000, 
2002) argue that the studying of policies elsewhere has been facilitated by the widespread 
availability of good-practice guides, reports, benchmarking studies and websites offering 
digestible descriptions of policy programmes and their successes. 
Academic accounts frequently, and quite correctly, highlight the rationales, 
mechanisms, actors and institutions behind the mobilisation of policies (see, for example, 
Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2004; Evans and Davies, 1999; Jones and Newburn, 
2007; Stone, 2004). These accounts, however, do have a tendency to underplay the processes 
through which policies are disembedded from, and re-embedded into, new political, 
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economic and social contexts and relations (Peck and Theodore, 2001). What is more, there 
has been little consideration of the multifaceted ways in which policies are interpreted and 
(re)presented as both ‘successful’ and ‘appropriate’. Policies, after all, are rarely transferred if 
they are considered inappropriate or (actually and potentially) unsuccessful. It is clear, 
therefore, that in order to understand fully the policy transfer of BIDs, a conceptual 
framework which emphasises the processual nature of policy transfer and the social 
construction of ‘success’ and ‘appropriateness’ is required. In this light, a framework will 
now be outlined. Fundamentally, this conceptual framework is based on the ontological 
understanding that policy transfer involves the processual and contingent disembedding, 
mobilisation and re-embedding of policies. Furthermore, it is argued that policy transfer is 
borne out of dissatisfaction with existing domestic policies and is achieved through 
negotiation, persuasion and augmentation. Elaborating on these ideas, the framework 
emphasises six core yet overlapping aspects that need empirical and conceptual attention. 
These are: 
1. The identification and construction of domestic policy problems. As policy transfer is often instigated 
by discontent with existing policies, attention needs to be paid to the processes and 
mechanisms through which domestic policy problems are identified, constructed, articulated 
and fed into the policy process. 
2. How policies are strategically selected and interpreted as being successful and appropriate. Within this, 
four elements need attention. First, the methods and criteria through which actually existing 
policies and places are strategically selected (over others). Secondly, the disembedding of a 
policy—in other words, the material and discursive ways in which a policy is stripped of its 
territorial political, economic and social contexts and relations into its “administrative or 
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methodological essence” or a ‘portable model’ (Peck and Theodore, 2001, p. 435). Thirdly, 
how the model is conceived and presented as both already successful in the donor’s locality 
and, in turn, soon-to-be-successful in the recipient’s destination. Fourthly, how the model is 
conceived and presented as an appropriate means to ‘fix’ the domestic policy problem and 
appropriate to the recipient’s social, economic and cultural context. 
3. How models are re-embedded into, and reshaped in, the new context. Chronologically following on 
from this, three elements need to be addressed here. First, how the model, together with its 
previous and inherent successes, is conceived and presented as being transferable—that is, 
able to work successfully in the recipient’s political, economic and social context. Secondly, 
how the model has deliberately been readjusted to fix the perceived policy problems, meet 
societal needs and work within existing governance strategies and institutions in the 
recipient’s locality. Thirdly, how the model has been reshaped and reconstituted through its 
new contextual political, economic and social relations following its rolling-out and how the 
rolled-out policy, in turn, reconstitutes its political, economic and social context.  
4. How and why actually existing policies are discursively used as a legitimisation tool. Attention needs to 
be paid to the ways in which policy-makers discursively utilise policies and places elsewhere, 
and their successes, in order to legitimise and gain support for these policy prescriptions and 
as part of post hoc policy justification. Within this, attention to the sources of the narratives 
and statistics as well as the dissemination strategies, consumption and recycling of these 
associative discourses is required.  
5. The actors and institutions involved in the policy transfer process and their roles within this. The core 
state and non-state actors and institutions involved in the transfer at a variety of scales and 
places need to be pinpointed (such as elected officials, civil servants, consultants, think-
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tanks, media officials). Furthermore, the contingent power relations between the actors and 
institutions, places and scales involved at the different stages also need to be teased out. 
6. The exclusions and silences within the policy transfer process. Just as certain places, actually existing 
policies and practices, actors and institutions, and evaluation and re-embedding methods are 
strategically involved in policy transfer, others are excluded from the process. Therefore, 
attention needs to be paid to the silences and exclusions from the process. In other words, 
which places, actually existing policies and practices, actors and institutions, and evaluation 
and re-embedding methods have been overlooked, excluded or silenced and why? 
This framework will now be utilised to conceptualise the recent transfer of BIDs into 
England and Wales. In order to understand this policy transfer, however, we must first turn 
to the 1990s when a policy problem within the management of town and city centres was 
surfacing and being articulated (and to which BIDs would soon after be proposed as a 
remedy). 
 
3. Business Improvement Districts in(to) England and Wales 
3.1 Identifying Policy Problems and Prescriptions in England and Wales 
The 1990s witnessed the widespread introduction of formal and informal local public– 
private partnerships (PPPs) responsible for the management of town and city centres in 
England and Wales. Popularly known as town centre management (TCM) schemes, their 
operations involve a mixture of ‘janitorial’ public space maintenance and more strategic 
planning and promotion of their centres (see Reeve, 2004; Warnaby et al., 1998). Funded in 
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large part by voluntary private-sector contributions, their goals were simple: to make their 
centres more economically competitive and attract higher footfall, spending and investment. 
Their introduction reflected the wider pluralisation and neo-liberalisation of the local state by 
the Conservative government. TCMs, in this sense, were one of many local PPPs—from 
Urban Development Corporations to Single Regeneration Budget boards—set up to 
stimulate economic growth through the ‘licensing out’ of state power to the private sector 
(Peck, 1995; Flinders, 2006). Their creation, importantly, was a response to a number of 
perceived problems on the high street. Most prominently, these were low consumer 
spending; the increased competition from neighbouring centres and the rising numbers of 
off-centre and out-of-town retailers; and a frustration with local council services by local 
businesses. Placing the private sector at the core of these partnerships, it was hoped, would 
unleash an efficient, innovative and market-sensitive approach to the governance of city 
centres. Capturing additional private-sector funding, it was further anticipated, would pay for 
this approach. 
By the late 1990s, TCM schemes had, for some, played a role in strengthening the 
competitiveness of town and city centres and in places like Manchester and Leeds helped to 
revive consumer spending, investment and footfall (Department of the Environment, 1996; 
Revell, 1998). Nonetheless, discontent with TCM’s financing mechanisms grew amongst 
TCM officials and their professional organisation, the Association of Town Centre 
Management (ATCM), in particular. Whilst most TCM schemes received substantial funding 
from their relevant local authority, the voluntary nature of private donations was considered 
problematic. For them, voluntary financing encouraged ‘free-riding’ from businesses who 
chose not to contribute financially to TCM but still enjoyed the ‘benefits for all’ as paid for 
by some of their neighbours. 
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Research by Medway et al. (1999, 2000) highlighted the reluctance of multiple retail 
chains and independent retailers to contribute financially to TCM schemes in the late 1990s. 
Not only were a very small minority of independent and multiple retailers contributing, their 
donations were modest, ad hoc and often ring-fenced for specific projects (such as CCTV 
installation, Christmas illuminations). This reluctance, therefore, led to limited funding for 
services, projects and the day-to-day running of TCM. 
This critical lack of funding was deemed detrimental to the quality of the TCM 
services and projects. This, it was feared, would damage the ability of town and city centres 
to attract spending and investment and ‘fight off ’ intraurban and interurban competition. In 
turn, this would harm the long-term profit margins of businesses in their locality (see Figure 
1). The following quote from an interview with an official from the Plymouth City Centre 
Company (October 2006) is emblematic of the widespread frustration with TCM’s voluntary 
funding and the feared ramifications of it: 
“The private sector provided limited amounts and a lot of free-riding was going on ... 
So it was a constant struggle to pull together something that was properly funded 
and would benefit everyone ... The partnership was not adequately funded. Not to 
deliver the service that we wanted. If you are talking about transforming the fortunes 
of the city centre, putting it on the map in terms of the region, and providing an 
environment that shoppers are attracted to ... then you have to have very significant 
resources.” 
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Figure 1. The feared problems evolving from the voluntary nature of private-sector funding 
for TCM. 
 
For the ATCM, an alternative TCM funding mechanism was necessary and a policy 
prescription needed to provide sizeable, sustainable and long-term funding for TCM. This 
broad prescription was heavily influenced by the emerging trans-Atlantic relations and 
reciprocal interactions since the mid 1990s between the ATCM and the International 
Downtown Association (IDA)—a professional organisation for downtown management 
whose membership and reach is overwhelmingly North American based and focused. 
Through these strengthening ties, the ATCM became increasingly aware of BIDs in the US: 
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an actually existing and seemingly successful example of sizeable, sustainable and long-term 
funding for downtown management. A pivotal moment in the search for a policy alternative 
was the joint organisation, together with the International Urban Development Association 
(INTA, based in The Hague), of the first World Congress of City Centre and Downtown 
Management in Coventry in April 1996 (see Grigsby, 1996). Attended by ATCM, IDA and 
INTA members and other key UK policy-makers, the conference facilitated interaction 
between officials and members from the different organisations. Arguably the conference 
allowed many ATCM officials and other public and private officials to hear about and 
discuss the experiences and ‘successes’ of US BIDs in depth for the first time. As one 
organiser of the conference commented: 
“We had speakers from all over Europe and from BIDs in the US. Talking about 
case studies, what they are doing, the good things, the bad things. People from all 
over, 800 or 900 people there in Coventry which was amazing ... [R]eally that was the 
first main exposure that we had as a country to Business Improvement Districts. 
And it was sponsored by government as well so we had the government ministers 
and senior civil servants there ... So there were all these connections going on, the 
Americans played a massive part ... A lot of people got a buzz out of it” (former 
senior official, Coventry City Council: interview, September 2006). 
This conference, in sum, helped to confirm to ATCM officials the need for a similar system 
of sustainable, sizeable and long-term funding in England and Wales. However, when a 
more detailed policy prescription was developed by the ATCM and its consultants at 
URBED and Leeds Metropolitan University (Shutt et al., 1999; URBED, 1997), BIDs were 
not the initial choice. Instead, ‘town improvement zones’ (TIZs) were proposed. At their 
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core, TIZs were a TCM funding mechanism that involved ‘matching’ of substantial public 
and private money over a fixed long-term period (rather than a BID mandatory levy on 
businesses or property owners and optional for other public and private organisations). The 
ATCM’s TIZs recommendations were further supported by the government-commissioned 
Urban Task Force (UTF) report advocating TIZs as one of 105 “practical solutions to bring 
people back into our cities, towns and urban neighbourhoods” (UTF, 1999, p. 1). 
Whilst the New Labour government readily accepted the need for a system of 
sizeable, sustainable and long-term funding of TCM, they considered TIZs inappropriate. In 
short, the financial commitment required of local authorities and the still voluntary nature of 
private-sector funding in the policy prescription were unpopular (interview, New Labour 
MP, February 2006). Instead, a mandatory financial commitment from the private sector 
which could be ‘topped up’ voluntarily by financially constrained local authorities was 
deemed more appropriate. In the eyes of government, BIDs rather than TIZs offered this. 
Somewhat paradoxically, the ATCM’s constant use of US BIDs as examples of sizeable, 
sustainable and long-term TCM funding in their lobbying for TIZs, actually further 
encouraged governmental officials to introduce BIDs rather than TIZs. 
The decision to formulate BIDs legislation in England and Wales was publicly 
confirmed by Tony Blair in April 2001 (see Blair, 2001). This was followed by the 
construction of legislation and regulations in England and Wales over the next few years. 
Passed in 2003 and 2004, the legislation and regulations focused exclusively on the creation, 
collection and administration of levies, voting mechanisms and appeals against the formation 
of BIDs. They did not cover the projects and services that BIDs could deliver1 with these 
decisions devolved to local BIDs’ boards. Furthermore, BIDs were neither compulsory 
	   16 
urban governance schemes nor mandatory replacements of TCM schemes. TCM could 
either ‘evolve’ into a BID, the BID could become the service-focused subsidiary of the more 
strategically minded TCM scheme, the BID and the TCM could co-exist as separate 
institutions, or a BID could emerge where no TCM scheme had previously existed. This 
organisational decision was also a ‘local decision’. With the legislation and regulations in 
place, the first local BID in England and Wales went ‘live’ in Kingston upon Thames on 
New Year’s Day 2005. 
 
3.2 Utilising the US East Coast ‘Model’ 
At this point, it is important to focus on two interrelated issues: first, the processes through 
which US BIDs were considered successful and appropriate; and, secondly, the exact ways in 
which US BID policies and practices have been drawn upon in the development of BIDs in 
England and Wales. In relation to the first issue, there was no apparent detailed 
commissioned or governmental research into the experience of BIDs abroad and their 
potential appropriateness prior to the decision to construct BIDs legislation. Instead, the 
government itself engaged in limited, ad hoc and arguably somewhat uncritical research into 
the success of US BIDs and their suitability to England and Wales. This included occasional 
informal meetings with US BID and IDA officials, the digestion of the examples of US BID 
‘success stories’ as told by the ATCM and a brief study tour of a BID in Bryant Park in June 
1997 by a group of senior MPs (including John Prescott and Richard Caborn) and senior 
officials from the then Department of the Environment (Harding, 1999; interview, senior 
official, Bryant Park Restoration Corporation, July 2005). These methods were considered 
sufficient to establish two key criteria: first, that BIDs were successful in the US; and, 
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secondly, that, with slight alterations, they would ‘work’ in England and Wales. 
This interest in, and utilisation of, US BIDs by English and Welsh policy-makers did 
not stop following Blair’s announcement to introduce BIDs. Instead, during the 
development of the subsequent legislation, regulations, BID pilot schemes and governmental 
BIDs ‘good-practice’ guidance, the glances towards the US—and selected US BIDs in 
particular—became more formalised, frequent and influential (interview, New Labour MP, 
February 2006). This was largely due to two factors: first, the perceived belief that the 
formulation of detailed BIDs policy and practice required much more thorough 
understandings of ‘what works’ (and what does not) than the previous ad hoc glances abroad; 
and, secondly, the institutionalisation of the ATCM (in the construction of BIDs regulations 
and the governance of the BIDs pilot scheme) brought a simultaneous institutionalisation of 
the ATCM’s belief that successful policies of US BIDs and the expertise of US officials must 
constantly be drawn upon. 
The national US BIDs experience, when disembedded and stripped down to its 
“administrative and methodological essence” (Peck and Theodore, 2001, p. 435), provided a 
portable and abstract definition of a BID—that is, a publicly sanctioned yet privately directed 
organisation that supplements public and private services to improve shared, geographically 
defined, outdoor public spaces and business services through a multiyear, compulsory 
property owner taxation mechanism (Hoyt, 2004). Clearly though, this was too abstract to be 
a fully-fledged policy prescription ready to be inserted into England and Wales. More 
detailed legislative and regulatory policy prescriptions and ‘good-practice’ guidance were 
therefore largely developed from readings of selected local US BIDs. This focus on local 
BIDs can be partly explained by the fragmented legislative system in the US where BIDs are 
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enabled by state laws and officially established by local ordinances; this leads to a wide 
variety of BID governance mechanisms, legislations and services (Briffault, 1999; Houstoun, 
2003; Morçöl and Zimmerman, 2006). This made detailed, coherent and nation-wide lessons 
difficult to find, construct and, in turn, utilise. 
The BID cities that dominated the mind-sets of English and Welsh policy-makers 
and advocates were the large east-coast cities of New York, Philadelphia and Washington. 
Within these cities, the downtown BIDs in Philadelphia (the Center City District) and 
Washington (Downtown DC BID) and New York’s three Midtown 42nd Street BIDs 
(Times Square Alliance, Bryant Park Corporation and Grand Central Partnership) 
preoccupied the English and Welsh élites’ attention. 
Of course, we need further to ask why these particular east coast downtown BIDs 
(here-after ECDBIDs) and BID cities were selected? In the numerous trans-Atlantic 
interviews conducted, a variety of reasons were cited. These include the impressive variety of 
services offered by these BIDs; the number and variety of BIDs within each city; the 
hospitable and charismatic nature of the BIDs officials; and their relative accessibility to 
organisers and participants of English and Welsh study tours. Arguably though, the prime 
reason for their selection was the BIDs’ association with, and perceived centrality to, the 
very visible and much publicised regeneration and ‘upgrading’ of their districts and their 
wider downtowns (Ward, 2006). Many of these overlapping factors were highlighted by one 
of the senior IDA officials interviewed (August 2005): 
“BIDs on the East Coast, in New York, Phila-delphia, Washington, attract a lot of 
the attention because they have got everything, you know, the budgets, the 
programmes, the personas ... and the BIDs with the glossy presentations ... and [the 
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officials in] New York and Philadelphia say some interesting stories about how the 
area has changed ... become better.” 
The English and Welsh policy-makers and advocates, therefore, were subtly influenced by 
the wider media and policy discourses around urban regeneration, revived economies, 
reduced levels of crime and revived public spaces within these downtowns and cities and in 
the US more generally. Through highly simplified casual linkages between the BIDs’ 
operations and the transformations in the area, the ECDBIDs were promoted and 
interpreted (somewhat uncritically) as ‘successful’ and, therefore, worthy of emulation. To 
establish their successes, already-existing statistics and narratives were drawn upon largely 
from the BIDs’ documents and websites. The statistics and narratives contained within these 
documents, of course, were somewhat self-congratulatory with the BID operations heralded 
as central to the dramatic transformations in their districts. Visitor numbers, occupancy 
rates, rental values and crime statistics dominated the carefully selected statistics within these 
texts (see Caruso and Weber, 2006). Together with the glossy photographs of the area 
(frequently binary ‘before’ and ‘after’ pictures), they offered a very attractive and deceptively 
simple policy success story. Furthermore, from the interviews conducted, many 
policymakers and advocates were rarely critical of these statistics, narratives and casual 
linkages being promoted. For some, arguably, simply being told that the policy was 
‘successful’ was enough to convince them of its success and applicability. 
Echoing the decision-making process prior to Blair’s announcement, there was a 
continued reliance on ad hoc evaluation methodologies during the development of 
governmental legislation, regulations and good-practice guidance. For instance, the methods 
continued to include the reading of websites and official BID publications and listening to 
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US BID officials at conferences. However, unlike before, the emphasis was now on what 
precise practices and ways of governing were successful and transferable, rather than on trying 
to establish whether BIDs, in general, were successful and transferable. 
One particularly prominent and more formalised methodology, however, was 
developed and utilised during the development of regulations and good-practice guidance: 
study tours. The various high-profile study tours were organised by the ATCM as well as the 
London-based Circle Initiative and the British Urban Regeneration Association (BURA). 
They allowed national, regional and local policy-makers, pilot BID officials, business 
association officials and potential local BID governors to visit schemes in the US. The east-
coast downtowns dominated the various study tours. However, selected smaller BIDs within 
Washington and Philadelphia were occasionally visited (and their senior officials introduced) 
and Baltimore’s Downtown Partnership was visited on several occasions. Furthermore, one 
ATCM study tour also visited BIDs in Tampa, Florida and Richmond, Virginia (interview, 
senior official no. 1, ATCM, February 2006). These destinations were selected, on the whole, 
by the organisers themselves. The interviews conducted with the various host officials, study 
tour organisers and participants revealed a common itinerary involving meeting with host 
senior officials,watching presentations overviewing the development and governance of the 
BID and its ‘impact’ on its neighbourhood and viewing their on-the-ground operations (such 
as watching the street-cleaning operations). 
Behind the various study tours was an implicit epistemological and methodological 
belief that by ‘seeing’ and ‘experiencing’ first-hand, the operations and ‘successes’ of the 
BIDs would be better visualised and understood. In turn, it was assumed that better-quality 
transferable lessons would be formulated from these more accurate first-hand 
	   21 
understandings. As one ATCM senior official (no. 2, interview, February 2006) explained: 
“You can read about [BIDs], you can then try and explain [what you have read] to a 
certain extent to people but actually going there, seeing it on the ground, meeting the 
individuals who are actually running it as opposed to just hearing them present at a 
conference, having a chance to ask the naïve questions, and that was the thing that 
made the real difference. ATCM ran a study tour that I went on ... [with] 45 of us, I 
think, went out from all of the pilots ... and we all came back as total enthusiasts for 
it but also [had] the answers and the ability then to present it in our own locations, to 
say, here’s what they do, and have the detailed answers ... You needed somebody to 
be on the ground who has experienced it and can understand it, and it changed from 
being an abstract concept of ‘oh, it is better-funded town centre management’ to 
being much more detailed, real thing that you could sell.” 
Of course, this quotation points to another important rationale behind the study tours: they 
were promotional exercises. That is, they were used to sell the concept of BIDs to 
policymakers, ATCM members, local businesses and business associations (although it is 
highly unlikely that hardened critics of BIDs went on the study tours). The content of the 
study tours, however, was not always deemed appropriate and the ‘time away’ was 
considered too long by some potential participants: 
“To be honest, study tours sound like a great idea but the problem was that early on 
my role was very broad and to rule out three, four or five days to go off and look at 
American BIDs ... was not something I could easily do ... Also I was not particularly 
interested in some of the things on it such as seeing how the warden schemes are 
working in America” (senior national official, Boots: interview, December 2006). 
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What is more, accepting a place on the study tours led in several cases to accusations of 
wasting public or private monies on ‘jollies’ (for example, see Rankin, 2003) or, as one 
unnamed US-based interviewee labelled it, “blatant policy tourism”. It is clear, therefore, that 
the ways in which policies elsewhere are ‘experienced’ and assessed are by no means 
universally utilised or welcomed. 
 
3.3 The ECDBIDs as an Associative Legitimisation Tool 
The ECDBIDs have been, and continue to be, heavily used as discursive tools both to gain 
support for their policy prescriptions and to justify the rolling-out of policies and practices. 
This appropriation of US BID ‘examples’ remains common-place throughout the speeches, 
policy documents, formal documents, meetings and conversations by English and Welsh 
policy-makers and advocates. Importantly, the construction, dissemination and consumption 
of these associative discourses and narratives are contingent and have been frequently 
circulated, recycled and reshaped for different groups for varying purposes. However, there 
are commonalities in the associative techniques and narratives used and the reasons behind 
this. 
The reasoning behind these associative techniques is quite apparent. From attempts 
to encourage MPs to vote for BID legislation to promotional efforts to encourage local 
businesses that a BID in their area is a ‘best investment decision’ (Raynsford, 2005a, p. 1), 
numerous public and private actors and institutions had to be convinced of the validity of 
the policy alternative. In order to achieve this, its advocates argued how and why these 
policies and practices will be successful once implemented. By associating the proposed 
	   23 
policy with actually existing examples of similar and successful policies, it was assumed that 
further legitimacy would be brought to their policy prescriptions. This tapped into, and 
attempted to reshape, two underlying widespread ‘common-sense’ understandings of the 
audiences: first, that BIDs were successful financing mechanisms for TCM and urban 
regeneration in general (particularly in the US east coast)2; and, secondly, what was successful 
elsewhere would be successful in their locality, albeit with slight adjustments (see Peck and 
Theodore, 2001). 
Impressive, overwhelmingly positive, audience-tailored and (most importantly) 
digestible narratives, statistics and examples of successful policies and practices elsewhere 
were central to these associative discourses. What is more, the desire to impress was 
reflected in the strategic choice of, and repetitive use of, the “big Rolls-Royce models of the 
east coast of the States” (interview, senior official, London BIDs, February 2006) and the 
Times Square Alliance in particular. The associative use of the ECDBIDs and their 
perceived successes was deemed to add kudos and respectability to their arguments. These 
discourses furthermore deliberately tapped into, and attempted to reshape, the audience’s 
existing ‘geographical imaginations’ and cognitive understandings of these places, particularly 
Times Square and New York City. These were conditioned in part by the wider and very 
positive media discourses of regeneration and by the economic, political and crime-control 
successes ‘against the odds’ in these areas mentioned earlier. In turn, associative discourses 
sought to flatter the audience with suggestions that their area could be as economically and 
socially successful as Times Square providing they followed the suggested ‘parallel’ policy 
prescription. 
Two particular common-place associative discursive techniques were commonly 
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drawn upon, and continue to be drawn upon, particularly by local officials trying to 
encourage support and positive votes for their proposed local BID scheme. The first is the 
use of brief and anecdotal examples and case studies of the operations and successes of 
selected US BIDs—especially the ECDBIDs—within domestic policy documents, 
conversations and speeches (for an example, see Figure 2). Secondly, the repetitive use of 
phrases such as the precursor ‘US-style’ or the use of ‘as was successful in’ instantly 
highlights the similarities between the two policies and places. Both techniques, however, 
were frequently used explicitly to connect, or transfer, the kudos and successes of the 
ECDBIDs with the future or existing developments of the author’s or speaker’s BID 
project. 
At the time of writing, however, BID practitioners and supporters are increasingly 
using the associative discourses of ECDBID successes in conjunction with discourses of the 
successes of the various BID pilots and the initial ‘live’ BIDs in England and Wales. The 
underlying theme behind the discursive use of both US and domestic examples is that BIDs 
are not only successful in the US but also ‘here’ in England and Wales. The experiences of 
pilot schemes, therefore, are increasingly being constructed and utilised as both an 
associative legitimisation tool and, as I will now demonstrate, as a policy and practice ‘re-
embedding’ mechanism. 
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Figure 2. Associative legitimisation of BIDs through the successes of the ECDBIDs  
Source: Kingston First (2004, p. 5). 
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3.4 Re-embedding and Reshaping English and Welsh BIDs 
Whilst there was a widespread and a somewhat uncritical belief that successful ECDBIDs 
would be successful in England and Wales, this was tempered by a widespread 
understanding that these models could not simply be ‘dropped’ unproblematically onto 
towns and cities throughout England and Wales. In addition to elements of ECDBIDs’ 
policy and practice being omitted and overlooked by English and Welsh policy-makers, the 
aspects that were transferred were often reshaped to fit perceived national and local contexts 
and requirements. Within this, numerous re-embedding strategies and mechanisms were 
developed and two particular nationally orchestrated examples will now be highlighted. 
The most disputed aspect in the translation of US BIDs into English and Welsh 
legislation was the alteration of the roles of property owners and business tenants in the 
financing and voting of local BIDs. The system of levying (that is, taxing) property owners in 
US BID areas was seen by government officials as incommensurable with the existing 
system of collecting local business taxation through business occupier rates in England and 
Wales (interview, senior New Labour MP, February 2006). Ministers argued that the taxing 
of property owners would require the creation of a register of property owners and the 
introduction of “a new tax” leading to unnecessary “administrative burdens” on local billing 
authorities (Raynsford, 2003, p. 1). A much simpler system was proposed whereby business 
occupiers were levied through an extension to the already-existing ‘business rates’ taxation 
mechanism. In turn, as business occupiers were the only group to pay the levy, they were 
also the only group eligible to vote to establish (or re-establish) a BID in their area. Property 
owners and residents, therefore, could not vote in local BID elections although both could 
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make voluntary contributions and have seats on the boards if approached. 
This re-embedding strategy by the government, however, was poorly received by 
several business groups. Indeed, the ATCM, the Circle Initiative and several business 
associations including the British Retail Consortium and the British Property Federation 
lobbied the government to amend the legislative Bill (Ashworth, 2003; Hirst, 2003; 
Mackenzie, 2003). Although these organisations were, and continue to be, largely in support 
of BIDs, their arguments were twofold. First, with no voting power, property owners would 
have little influence in the creation and operations of local BIDs. Secondly, tenants would be 
more reluctant to vote for local BIDs as they would fear that it could lead to increased rents 
and property owners ‘freeloading’ on tenants’ levy contributions (Ashworth, 2003). These 
criticisms, however, were rejected by the government, although they did agree to conduct a 
long-term review of the role of property owners in BIDs legislation (see York Consulting, 
2006). 
Another key re-embedding mechanism took place after the passing of the legislation. 
This was the piloting of BIDs in selected towns and cities in England and Wales and the 
construction of ‘official’ good-practice guidance from the local pilots. Two pilot governing 
schemes materialised in England and Wales: a central London ‘Circle Initiative’ pilot scheme 
with five local pilots and an ODPM-commissioned, ATCM co-ordinated ‘national’ pilot 
scheme with 21 local pilots in England and one in Wales (see Figure 3). Whilst the Circle 
Initiative pilot schemes showcased on-the-ground services and local governance structures 
from January 2001 to March 2006 (interview, senior official, London BIDs, February 2006), 
it was not as influential as the ‘official’ ATCM pilot scheme in the development of BIDs 
policy and practice within England and Wales. For this reason, I shall concentrate on 
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detailing the ATCM pilot scheme. 
The ATCM pilot scheme ran from January 2003 to June 2005 and was one of the 
many New-Labour-commissioned urban policy pilot schemes (see Jowell, 2003). The ATCM 
pilots, however, were not ‘traditional’ pilot schemes as they were neither a precursor to the 
governmental decision to legislate BIDs nor did they seek to ‘demonstrate’ the effectiveness 
of on-the-ground BID services and projects as the name ‘pilot’ suggests. Instead, the ATCM 
pilots were more public-private ‘talking-shops’ responsible for formulating individual 
business plans for, and gaining business support for, post-pilot ballots. In other words, they 
were responsible for making the pilot schemes ‘ballot-ready’ (interview, senior official no. 1, 
ATCM, February 2006). However, the ATCM pilots played a wider and perhaps more 
crucial role in the re-embedding of BIDs in two ways. First, the local pilot officials assisted 
the ODPM in the construction and wording of BID regulations in England. Secondly, 
selected ‘good practices’ from the pilots’ development were extracted, generalised and 
formed key elements of the ATCM’s, the ODPM’s and the National Assembly for Wales’ 
‘official’ good-practice (written and verbal) guidance (see for example, Reilly and Szabo, 
2005). 
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Figure 3. The location of BID pilot schemes in England and Wales 
 
It was felt by ATCM and ODPM officials that the good-practice guidance developed 
from the ATCM pilot schemes would be appropriate for all practitioners and places in 
England and Wales due to the large number of local pilots and the variety of local contexts 
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in which these pilots were inserted and developed. Indeed, a range of ‘geographical locations’ 
was an explicit goal in the pilot selection process (Reilly and Szabo, 2005). As Jacquie Reilly 
(2003, p. 8) of the ATCM argued, the selection process “wasn’t about saying ‘These are the 
ten strongest candidates for a BID’ but ‘How can we research how it works in different 
places’”. However, on closer inspection, the ‘nation-wide’ tag and the implied ‘geographical 
variety’ of pilots are debatable with, for instance, only one pilot scheme within Wales 
(Swansea) and no pilot schemes in industrial estates (where several live BIDs have 
subsequently emerged). Furthermore, the explicitly geographical aspect of the selection 
process was based upon naïve understandings of local contextual difference, with locations 
selected primarily for their different economic fortunes, business residents and, perhaps 
most crudely, population sizes. This, in turn, means that the already-problematic labeling of 
the good practice developed as ‘generic’ and ‘nationally applicable’ is somewhat 
inappropriate and, even, misleading. 
These re-embedding mechanisms and strategies, therefore, demonstrate yet again 
that a straightforward importation of BIDs from the ECDBIDs did not take place. Instead, 
the reality reflects Reilly’s (2003, p. 8) assertion that “the USA may have been the inspiration 
for BIDs in the UK, but the UK system is not a straightforward clone”. What is more, the 
various local English and Welsh BID schemes are embedded into, and emerging from, a 
contextually specific and often highly path-dependent set of social, economic and political 
relations and networks (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). The BIDs’ internal structures, goals 
and services have, therefore, been shaped, constrained and facilitated by their local and 
extra-local context and the relationship between them. Most importantly, they are constituted 
by the (interpretation of) localised customs, mechanisms and goals of politically organising 
businesses, delivering public and business services and partnership-working. Relatedly, local 
	   31 
BIDs are also shaped by their interactive, and often reciprocal, relations with other actors and 
institutions (for instance, through consultation, joint working and, of course, conflict). 
Within this, BIDs are also shaped internally by the insights, decisions and debates of local 
economic and political representatives on their boards and committees. However, not only 
are BIDs constituted by the contextual relations and connections that they are embedded in 
and actively construct, they also actively reshape these contextual relations and connections. 
Indeed, the rolling-out of BIDs reconstitutes wider mechanisms and practices of politically 
organising businesses and delivering public and business services in which they are situated. 
In sum, then, through deliberate re-embedding mechanisms and the BIDs’ national 
and local contextual relations, BIDs—from Coventry’s city centre to Bolton’s industrial 
estates—are significantly different from their ‘origins’ in the US east coast. 
 
3.5 (Legitimising) Exclusions and Silences 
The BIDs policy transfer process involved strategic exclusions and silencing which now 
need to be highlighted and examined. Perhaps the most telling absence from the policy 
transfer and rolling-out of BIDs was the lack of involvement by employees, residents and 
the wider public. These groups were rarely involved in constructing national and local BIDs 
policies and practices on both sides of the Atlantic. From New York City to Bristol, they 
continue to be unable to vote in local BID elections and are largely absent from local 
partnership boards3. Furthermore, the desire to meet the perceived and actual direct needs 
and desires of employees, residents and citizens was absent and silenced. Instead, the direct 
needs and desires of employers, businesses and, to a lesser extent, consumers prevailed. The 
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construction of a funding alternative for TCM and the development of Business 
Improvement Districts, as the name suggests, was conceived and legitimised as a business 
policy (interview, senior official, National Assembly for Wales, March 2006). Therefore, 
New Labour created new institutional spaces (Jones, 1999) at national and local scales for 
businesses and employers rather than residents, employees and the wider public. 
In many ways, this institutionalisation of business leaders and the prioritisation of 
‘business needs’ was legitimised through discourses emphasising the benefits of BIDs to 
businesses, local government and consumers alike. Nick Raynsford, the ex-Minister of State 
for Local Government and the Regions, for instance, argued that the benefits of BIDs “will 
not be felt by businesses alone: people from local areas and beyond will enjoy a cleaner, 
safer, more pleasant environment in which to shop, work and socialise. Bids are therefore a 
real win:win” (Raynsford, 2005b, p. 1). This echoes MacDonald’s (2000, p. 401) argument 
that benefits produced by BIDs are “available to all city residents, not just BID members. 
We are all free riders on BIDs expenditure”. 
The BIDs’ focus on the needs of businesses was justified through the rhetoric of 
‘trickle-down’. These discourses revolved around the assumption that the BIDs policies for, 
and by, businesses would indirectly but eventually benefit the wider consuming public, 
primarily through a more competitive local economy and an improved ‘trading environment’ 
and ‘shopping experience’. BIDs were also promoted as being beneficial to local 
governments through bringing additional and supplementary public and business services 
without public costs (although local governments can make voluntary donations). 
In many senses, the framing of BIDs as a ‘business policy’ guided what was searched 
for, and noted by, the English and Welsh policy-makers in their observations of ECDBIDs. 
	   33 
Relatedly, this also guided what was promoted by the US BIDs and IDA officials (who also 
viewed BIDs as a business policy) when faced with interested observers from England, 
Wales and elsewhere. Combined, it is unsurprising that positive business narratives of 
revived economies and trading environments, incorporating statistics of increased visitor 
numbers and occupancy rates, dominated English and Welsh policy-makers’ discourses and 
mindsets. Other aspects which were not directly linked to profitability were considered 
unimportant and not promoted, heard about, observed or emulated. For instance, the US 
BIDs’ ability (or inability) to improve either employees’ work conditions and pay or the 
public space and ‘shopping experience’ for those with low or no consumer power were 
rarely, if ever, of interest to on-looking policy-makers and advocates. What is more, these 
issues were rarely espoused when legitimising national legislation and regulations or local 
proposals in England and Wales. After all, locally it was only businesses—in the form of 
occupiers—who were able to vote to establish BIDs and not residents, employees or the 
public in general. These issues, therefore, were dismissed as either irrelevant or 
uncompetitive. 
In addition, nationally and locally, there was a widespread reluctance to emulate the 
frequently used US discourses promoting the BIDs’ purported ability to increase rental 
values of local properties (see Ellen et al., 2006). This reluctance is not because of a belief 
that the linkages between BIDs and increased property values are tenuous. Instead, it reflects 
the contentious decision by Whitehall, highlighted earlier, to levy business occupiers rather 
than property owners. Should occupiers hear such discourses, they might be less likely to 
vote for a BID scheme, fearing that its success may make occupiers vulnerable to increased 
rents. 
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When English and Welsh local and national policy-makers studied and talked about 
the ECDBIDs, they were selective in what they studied, remembered, adapted and used to 
legitimise their schemes. This, however, was fundamentally conditioned by the initial 
selectivity of the host US BIDs and IDA senior officials. It is these officials who, for 
instance, showcased their BIDs on the study tours and conferences and compiled their 
annual reports and websites that the English and Welsh policy-makers and advocates drew 
upon. It is unsurprising, therefore, that neither the hosts’ reports, presentations and agendas 
nor the on-lookers’ notes rarely featured the BIDs’ shortfalls and failures. It is, therefore, 
quite possible that English and Welsh policy-makers and advocates may have been, or 
continue to be, unaware of many of the existing problems, shortfalls and negative 
consequences of US BIDs’ policies and practices such as those outlined earlier on in the 
introduction. 
More widely, it is useful to examine why certain places, which have their own BID 
schemes, were ignored or sidelined by English and Welsh policy-makers and explain why this 
is important. Perhaps the most evident absence is the experiences of BIDs outside the US, 
especially that of Canada—where they first emerged and spread under the guise of Business 
Improvement Areas (BIAs). No research was conducted into the success and 
appropriateness of BIDs in Canada or elsewhere outside the US. Arguably, though, the US 
BID system was selected over Canadian (or South African or other) systems for four largely 
anecdotal reasons: first, its perception as hosting more ‘innovative’ and, with the exception 
of Canada, older and more developed BIDs than elsewhere; secondly, selected US BIDs and 
their areas’ regeneration ‘success stories’ were already much better known in English and 
Welsh policy-making circles; thirdly, US BIDs were seen as developing in supposedly more 
similar political-economic contexts; and, fourthly, through the emerging relationship 
	   35 
between the ATCM and IDA, the US had far stronger personal and professional ties with 
the advocates and policy-makers in England and Wales. 
Within the US, BIDs in towns and cities that had not visibly undergone an aesthetic 
transformation or, on paper, reversed downtown decline were seldom, if ever, drawn upon. 
Unsurprisingly then, the BIDs in Detroit or Camden, New Jersey, for instance, were rarely 
heard of or spoken about in England and Wales. Furthermore, suburban and rural BIDs did 
not attract much interest. Arguably, though, a more explicit focus on these by England and 
Welsh policy-makers and advocates may have informed the policy process in three useful 
ways: first, by dampening the often overenthusiastic, grandiose claims of BIDs advocates; 
secondly, by providing examples of what policies and practices were not successful; and, 
thirdly, by revealing how they work outside large downtown districts. 
Relatedly, the exclusive focus on the ECDBIDs left English and Welsh policy-
makers with an unenviable dilemma. Whilst the budgets of the ECDBIDs were impressive, 
they were far larger budgets per square footage of public space than any BID could hope to 
achieve across the Atlantic. This was due to the vast size and value of the commercial 
properties in the ECDBIDs’ boundaries (especially those in Midtown Manhattan). 
Therefore, they could provide particular services and a particular level of service that places 
elsewhere are simply unable to afford. It is also almost impossible to replicate these finances 
without huge public subsidies or large business taxations. This, in turn, left local BID policy-
makers in England and Wales with the almost-impossible situation of wishing to replicate 
the ECDBIDs without having the funds to do so. Attempting to emulate such cities clearly 
had its drawbacks. 
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4. Conclusion 
This paper has critically examined the processes and conduits through which Business 
Improvement Districts have travelled from the US to England and Wales. In doing this, it 
has shown how and why a new and important form of urban governance has been adopted, 
rolled out and discursively legitimised. More specifically, the paper has explored how BIDs 
were promoted (albeit inadvertently) as providing a sizeable, sustainable and long-term 
financing mechanism for fiscally struggling town centre management schemes. It has also 
demonstrated that lessons were not simply drawn from ‘nation-wide’ US experiences and 
policies, but from particular east coast downtown BIDs. These caught the attention of 
English and Welsh élites because of their associations with the much-heralded regeneration 
and economic revival in their business districts. Quite simply, they were seen as being highly 
successful and, therefore, worthy of emulation. What is more, narratives of these ECDBIDs 
were consistently drawn upon by national and local policy-makers in England and Wales to 
legitimise their policy decisions and ‘demonstrate’ the success and, in turn, the potential of 
BIDs. The paper, furthermore, has reflected on the ways in which the BID ‘model’ was 
reshaped for, and within, the English and Welsh context. From the various pilot schemes to 
the decision to make occupiers rather than owners pay the BID levy, the BID model has 
been deliberately reshaped to ‘fit’ its new economic, social and cultural contexts. 
Whilst the paper focuses empirically on BIDs, it also speaks to the wider literature 
on, and conceptualisations of, urban policy transfer. The process-based framework together 
with the empirical study have underlined six fundamental aspects about the nature of policy 
transfer that require academic attention. First, policy transfer involves, directly and indirectly, 
a wide variety of actors and institutions within and beyond formal state institutions, situated 
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in complex power-relations, at and across various places and scales. Secondly, policy transfer 
is largely born out of dissatisfaction with existing policies, whereby these policies are 
considered to be (now) inappropriate, unsuccessful and in need of alteration. Thirdly, similar 
to the previous point, policies elsewhere are evaluated largely on their existing and 
‘forthcoming’ success and appropriateness. The methods and criteria used to judge these 
policies are often qualitative, informal and ad hoc whilst the criteria used are frequently 
narrowly economic. Fourthly, policy transfer involves complex processes whereby policies 
are disembedded from, and re-embedded into, new political, economic and social contexts 
and relations. Upon re-embedding, policies are both deliberately and inadvertently reshaped 
into new forms. Fifthly, policy transfer is inherently discursive as it involves argumentation, 
negotiation and legitimisation. Policies elsewhere and their successes, furthermore, are 
frequently drawn upon in order to justify future or previous policies or practices. Sixthly and 
finally, policy transfer is inherently selective with certain policies, practices, discourses, 
actors, institutions and methods being used whilst others are sidelined or silenced. 
These six points, when used in conjunction, offer a nuanced way in which 
conceptually to frame further work into what McCann (2007) calls “urban policy mobilities”. 
To be sure, more research into BIDs and urban policy transfer is required. For instance, in 
numerous post-communist central European states, interest in BIDs is growing with BIDs 
already established in Serbia and Albania and being discussed and formulated in several 
others (Hoyt, 2006). This is fascinating, on-going and arguably part of the wider 
Westernisation and neo-liberalisation of these states. Yet, it has received little of the 
academic attention that it so clearly deserves. More research into BIDs within England and 
Wales is also necessary. At the time of writing, it is too early to provide a thorough analysis 
of the actual successes and long-term trajectories of BIDs in England and Wales. Future 
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research is, therefore, necessary to capture their on-going national and local evolution, 
development and mobilisation. Although high-profile and important elements of the 
contemporary urban governance landscape, BIDs, however, are merely the tip of the ‘urban 
policy mobilities’ iceberg. Further empirical and conceptual research is required to 
understand fully the intricacies, processes, mechanisms and geographies of urban policy 
transfer and the framework offered in this paper can be utilised to research this. 
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respectively, with local BIDs set to roll out from 2008 onwards (Scottish Executive, 2007). 
This paper, however, will not comment further on the development of BIDs in Scotland. 
2 This common-sense understanding is reflected in the ATCM’s Jacquie Reilly’s (2004, p. 21) 
assertion that BIDs’ “potential for improving the public realm cannot be disputed”. 
3 The latter is in contrast to Blair’s wider partnership agenda which has, to a limited extent 
and in particular policy areas, sought to involve selected ‘community’ and ‘voluntary’ actors 
on local partnership boards (Raco and Flint, 2001). 
 
